

Austerity and Illusion

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Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes any distinctive account of illusion. To this end, we begin with a simple, naïve account of veridical perception. We then examine the case that this account cannot be extended to illusions. By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument, we show that it depends critically on the contention that perceptual experience is diaphanous, or more minimally and precisely, that there can be no difference in phenomenal properties between two experiences without a difference in the scenes presented in those experiences. Finding no good reason to accept this claim, we develop and defend a simple, naïve account of both veridical perception and illusion, here dubbed Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

1. Naïve Realism

Naïve realism is the view that the conscious character of experience in genuine cases of perception is constituted, at least in part, by non-representational perceptual relations between subjects and aspects of the mind-independent world. On this view, aspects of mind-independent reality are presented in experience, and thereby constitutively shape the contours of consciousness (Martin 1997, 2004, Fish 2009, Kalderon 2015).

Prescinding from any epistemic connotations, call the relation at the heart of the naïve realist account, *conscious acquaintance* (Campbell 2002, Fish 2009, Brewer 2011, Soteriou 2013).

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And call those entities with which we are acquainted, the *presented elements* of experience (Martin 1998). We'll talk mainly of objects and their features, but presented elements evidently include entities of other sorts (e.g. events).¹ The naïve realist makes two key claims about such elements. First, that they include mind-independent entities. Second, that being literal constituents of experience, such elements must actually exist for a subject to be in a state of that fundamental kind (Martin 2006). The objects of experience in cases of genuine perception thus contrast with the objects of thought, imagination and memory. More will be said. First, we consider why illusions are so widely thought to thwart naïve realism.

2. The Problem of Illusion

The problem of illusion for naïve realism runs as follows:

- (A) Naïve realism fails for (certain) illusory experiences.
- (B) The same account must be given of all perceptual experiences as of illusory experiences.
- (C) Naïve realism fails for all perceptual experiences.

(A) is an instance of what Snowdon (1992: 68) calls the “Base Case”, where a negative claim is made about a certain sort of case – here, (certain) illusions. (B) is an instance of what Snowdon calls the “spreading step”, where the Base Case claim is generalized. Here we focus just on (A). What argument can be given for (A)?

One obvious candidate is the first part of the traditional argument from illusion:

¹ See Johnston (2011: 174ff) for an initial catalogue.

- i. In an illusory experience, it seems to one that something has a quality, *F*, which the ordinary object supposedly being perceived does not actually have.
- ii. When it seems to one that something has a quality, *F*, then there is something of which one is aware which does have this quality.
- iii. Since the ordinary object in question is, by hypothesis, not-*F*, then it follows that in cases of illusory experience, one is not aware of the object after all. (Crane and French 2016)

This argument will not help us here. Not only is it invalid (French and Walters 2018), but its second premise – the so-called Phenomenal Principle (Robinson 1994: 32) – is rejected by both naïve realists and their contemporary intentionalist rivals.

To understand (A)'s appeal, we need to look instead to more recent literature. To this end, consider two examples of illusions as usually conceived by philosophers: perceptual experiences wherein a perceived object appears other than it is.²

Car Case: *S* sees a red car under streetlights; it looks orange to her (Fish 2009: 150).

Window Case: *S* sees a rectangular window on the fourth floor of a building, from street level; it looks square to her (ibid: 159).

² Not all illusions fit this mould (Johnston 2006, and Batty and Macpherson 2016).

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Before considering these examples, let us ask what a simple, naïve realist account of ordinary veridical perception must minimally involve. Suppose *S* sees a red car and it looks red to her. Here the naïve realist can simply appeal to the car and its redness to account for the experience. More generally, in such ordinary cases, the naïve realist has no need to appeal to presented elements other than ordinary, mind-independent objects (e.g. cars, windows) and their basic visible qualities (e.g. colors, shapes and sizes). Doubtless, natural scenes contain many interrelated such elements. And these elements are quite heterogeneous (think of flashes, mists and shadows). However, the claim here is not that presented elements are all of a piece (“moderate-sized specimens of dry goods”), but rather that those required to account for ordinary cases of perception are confined to familiar elements of our environments and their familiar visible features.

Suppose this is right. Then the most minimal naïve realist account of *illusion* holds that only the very same elements required to account for ordinary veridical cases are needed: familiar mind-independent objects and their basic visible properties.³ In particular, no appeal is required to special appearance or perspectival-properties, nor to sense-data or intentional aspects of experience. Note that we do not suppose that an exhaustive specification of simple elements and basic visible aspects can be given in abstract terms. Rather we take it to be common knowledge that certain features can be presented in ordinary veridical cases of perception, and deny that illusions require us to recognize any further elements.

Call these two claims, respectively, *Simplicity* and *Austerity*.

³ A model for us here is Martin’s “parsimonious view of looks” which “proposes that we identify the looks of objects with their basic visible properties, including their colors and shapes” (2010: 161).

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Simplicity: The character-constituting presented elements of ordinary veridical experience are just ordinary visible features of the mind-independent world: the objects we ordinarily take ourselves to see and their basic visible properties.

Austerity: Illusions do not differ from veridical cases (as understood in Simplicity), neither in relational nature, nor in the kind of character-constituting presented elements to which they are relations.

Together, these claims articulate *Simple, Austere Naïve Realism*. They entail that the same (and only the same) simple presented elements of mind-independent reality which constitutively shape the contours of conscious experience in veridical perception also do so in cases of illusion.

The most straightforward application of Simple, Austere Naïve Realism to the examples above holds that in Car Case, *S* is acquainted with the car and its redness, and that these presented elements are constitutive of character; and that in Window Case, *S* is acquainted with the window and its rectangularity, and that these presented elements are constitutive of character – no other novel or additional presented elements are needed. Simple, Austere Naïve Realism thus declines to offer any distinctive theory of illusion.

Proponents and opponents of naïve realism alike either quickly reject or simply fail to consider this approach. Proponents of naïve realism typically instead formulate some alternative account of illusions (e.g. Fish 2009, Kalderon 2011b, Genone 2014). In so doing they implicitly or explicitly concur with their opponents that Simple, Austere Naïve Realism is untenable (e.g. Foster 2000, Smith 2010, Block 2010). In the next section, we reconstruct an explicit version

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of the underlying argument against Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. By doing so, we expose how it depends critically on the assumption that perceptual experience is diaphanous, or more minimally and precisely, that there can be no difference in phenomenal properties between two experiences without a difference in the scenes presented in those experiences. Call this the Difference Principle. In section four, we examine how the Difference Principle has forced naïve realists to elaborate accounts of illusion which reject one or both elements of Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. In section five, we explain how rejecting the Difference Principle frees the naïve realist to embrace Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. Finally, in section six, we reply to three arguments for the Difference Principle.

3. Exposing the Difference Principle

A. D. Smith presents the core objection to Simple, Austere Naïve Realism as follows:

Consider ... a case where a green square looks yellow to me, though it does look square.... This square's shape furnishes the phenomenal character of the illusory perception ... in the respect of being as of a square. What, however, about the apparent yellowness? It, clearly, must be accounted for by something other than the green square being a constituent of the experience, since this is the case when a green square veridically looks green to me. Some extra, "bad" factor, over and above the green square's being a constituent, must, therefore, be attributed to this partially illusory state to account for the illusorily appearing colour: something that is absent in the case of completely veridical perception, where the constituent object itself does all the work. (2010: 388-389)

Smith imagines two cases: a veridical perception of a green square which looks green to him; and an illusory perception of a green square which looks yellow to him. Can an account of the illusory case be given in terms of a green square being a constituent of the experience, as

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Austerity would have it? Smith thinks “clearly” not, because that is the account of the veridical case. Presumably, his thought is that if the illusory case shared its presented elements with the veridical case then the two cases would have the same color character, which evidently they do not.

Fish articulates the core objection even more explicitly. He again compares two cases: a veridical experience of a red car looking red to *S*; and an illusory experience of the same red car looking orange to *S* (Car Case above). Fish then poses a dilemma for the naïve realist which divides over whether they treat both cases as involving acquaintance with the car’s being red. If they do, Fish claims that both will have to be alike in color phenomenology, when evidently they are not. If they do not, then they appear to have no alternative acquaintance-with-concrete-facts (i.e. Fish-style naïve realist) story to tell. “Either way,” Fish concludes, “there looks to be no way of supplying the illusory experience with an alternative phenomenal property with which to account for the difference in what it is like to have the illusory experience of the relevant feature.” (2009: 150-151)

Fish seizes the second horn of the dilemma, developing a more sophisticated acquaintance-with-concrete-facts story for the illusory case (see below). However, our present interest is why Fish thinks that Simple, Austere Naïve Realism fails. What we are given is this: if Simple, Austere Naïve Realism is true, then the veridical and illusory car experiences must have the same color phenomenal properties. Since they don’t, Simple, Austere Naïve Realism is false.

In rejecting Simple, Austere Naïve Realism, Smith and Fish thus assume that if two experiences have different phenomenal properties, they must have different character-constituting presented elements. This critical assumption is an aspect of a thesis which Martin labels

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“Diaphaneity”, the thesis that “sameness and difference of phenomenal properties just are sameness and difference in [character-constituting] presented elements” (Martin 1998: 175).⁴

Diaphaneity entails two conditional principles:

Difference Principle: Necessarily, if two experiences differ in phenomenal character then they differ in character-constituting presented elements.

Sameness Principle: Necessarily, if two experiences are alike in phenomenal character then they are alike in character-constituting presented elements.

The Difference Principle will be our focus in what follows. In addition to Smith and Fish, the principle is endorsed by many other critics of naïve realism. Foster assumes it when he argues that the mere existence of “cases of non-veridical perception immediately establishes that [naïve realism], as a general theory of perception is mistaken” on the grounds that naïve realism guarantees “full veridicality” and “leaves no room for cases in which ... how things sensibly appear ... is at variance with the character of the perceived item” (2000: 64). Likewise, Block’s argument against naïve realism “based on the fact that [in special experimental contexts] ... there can be more than one phenomenal character of experience of the same instantiated properties, even if nothing about the environment or the non-mental relations between the

⁴ Martin cites Price 1932. Theorists (e.g. Block 2010) sometimes talk about “Moorean Diaphaneity” following Moore 1903. Diaphaneity should not be conflated with transparency. As we discuss in §6, perceptual experience may be transparent (in that introspection of such experience inevitably involves attention to presented elements) without being diaphanous. As a result, there is no reason that Simple, Austere Naïve Realism should not partly be motivated by appeal to transparency (Martin 2002).

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subject and the environment differs” (2010: 49-50) lapses if the Difference Principle is rejected. Pautz’s (2017) critique that naïve realism is unable to accommodate phenomenal differences arising from differing neural response dispositions also assumes that naïve realist phenomenal character is grounded in “nothing but” (24) the presented scene. This implies the Difference Principle. Finally, Brogaard’s (2018) suggestion that cases which show that the “phenomenology of experience is not exhausted by the external object and its perceptible properties instances” count against naïve realism (9) also assumes the Difference Principle.

With all this in mind, we now formulate our target argument against Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

The Difference Argument

Take an object O , a perceiver S , and a pair of perceptual contexts C_1 and C_2 . Suppose that O instantiates sensible quality F , and consider G , where F and G are incompatible.

- (1) Let C_1 be an ordinary case of veridical perception in which S experiences O as F .
- (2) Let C_2 be a case of illusion in which S experiences O as G .
- (3) So, there is a difference in phenomenal properties between the experience of O in C_1 and the experience of O in C_2 .
- (4) **The Difference Principle:** Necessarily, if two experiences differ in phenomenal character then they differ in character-constituting presented elements.
- (5) So, there is a difference in character-constituting presented elements between the experience of O in C_1 and the experience of O in C_2 .

- (6) **Simplicity:** The character-constituting presented elements of ordinary veridical experience are just ordinary visible features of the mind-independent world: the objects we ordinarily take ourselves to see and their basic visible properties.
- (7) In C_1 , the relevant character-constituting presented elements are simply O and its F -ness.
- (8) It's not the case that, in C_2 , the relevant character-constituting presented elements are simply O and its F -ness.
- (9) **Austerity:** Illusions do not differ from veridical cases (as understood in Simplicity), neither in relational nature nor in the kind of character-constituting presented elements to which they are relations.
- (10) The only relevant character-constituting presented elements of the same kind as those required to account for ordinary cases of veridical perception which are present in C_2 are O and its F -ness.
- (11) In C_2 , the relevant character-constituting presented elements are simply O and its F -ness.

CONTRADICTION

To apply the argument to Car Case, we simply take C_1 as daylight and C_2 as streetlight, and stipulate that no car-substitute is available to step-in as a presented element and that the car is no other color than red.

The Difference Argument exposes a fundamental tension between Simplicity, Austerity and the Difference Principle. As such, it represents a significant step towards (A) above – the claim that naïve realism fails for (certain) illusions. The argument does not establish (A). It does show

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that, given the Difference Principle, Simple, Austere Naïve Realism fails and that the naïve realist owes some other positive account of illusions.

In the next section we briefly review the positive accounts developed by three naïve realists: Kalderon (2011b), Fish (2009) and Genone (2014). Despite their various differences, we show how all three accounts reject Austerity, and with it Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

4. Anti-Austerity

To account for the illusions under discussion, the naïve realist will naturally appeal to facts about the perceiver's perspective and perceptual conditions. Thus, plausibly, in Window Case, *S* sees the rectangular window as square *because she is looking at it from a certain point of view*, and in Car Case, *S* sees the red car as orange *because it is illuminated by streetlights*. More generally, differences in character between the kinds of veridical and illusory pairs targeted by the Difference Argument arise because of differences in perspective and perceptual conditions.

This *Appeal to Perspective* doesn't tell us *how* facts about perspective and conditions explain phenomenal differences. Yet almost without exception, they are taken to play an *availability role*: they affect *which* presented elements are available to shape phenomenal character.⁵ This respects the Difference Principle. However, because there are no differences in the ordinary objects and basic visible qualities presented across our veridical and illusory pairs, this way of exploiting the *Appeal to Perspective* means introducing additional non-simple elements in

⁵ Cf. Beck on "selectionism" (2019: 610-611).

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accounting for illusions, and so the rejection of Austerity. If such additional elements are also held to play a role in veridical perceptual experiences, Simplicity too will be rejected.

To illustrate, consider the accounts of three contemporary naïve realists.⁶ First, Kalderon. Kalderon (2011b) argues that in cases such as Car Case, whilst the car's redness is present in experience, so is its *orange look*. For Kalderon, this look is a sensible aspect of the car's objective color (Kalderon 2008). In different perceptual conditions, different looks are available to shape character. Under streetlights, the car's *orange look* is selected and so shapes character. In natural light, that same aspect of the car's redness is not selected, instead its *red look* is. Thus, prevailing perceptual conditions make different looks available.

Second, Fish. Fish (2009) thinks of perspective and perceptual conditions not merely as *selecting* which features shape character but as partly *determining* what is there to be selected.⁷ For instance, in Car Case, Fish denies that *S* is acquainted with the fact of the car's being red. Instead, *S* is acquainted with the car's exhibiting a certain (presumably orange or orange-looking) *shade*, where this shade is a relational property determined partly by the car's color but partly by relevant illumination conditions (158).⁸ Since the car has this property only relative to the current perceptual conditions, those conditions play a *determinative availability role*.

Finally, Genone also endorses a determinative role for perceptual conditions. For Genone, appearances, whilst “*entirely mind-independent*” (2014: 357) properties, are distinct from the

⁶ We discuss Campbell and Brewer's accounts in the next section.

⁷ Here we focus just on Fish's account of physical (as opposed to cognitive and optical illusions) (2009: 148-9).

⁸ Despite ordinary usage, “shades” in Fish's technical idiolect are not colors or basic visible qualities.

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basic visible properties of objects such as their sizes, shapes and colors. Rather, appearances are relational “properties an object has in a given perceptual context” (366, fn. 34), possessed “in virtue of their intrinsic properties and various environmental conditions” (357). Thus, in Car Case, the subject is aware of the car’s appearance (not its color), where this is a relational property jointly determined by its actual color and the sodium street-light context. The subject may mistakenly judge that the car is orange insofar as this appearance is indiscriminable for the perceiver from the appearance of an orange car in daylight (362).⁹

Despite their differences, Kalderon, Fish and Genone all understand perspective and perceptual conditions to play an availability role, allowing cases of illusion to be handled in conformity with the Difference Principle.¹⁰ The price is Austerity. For differences in perspective do not change which ordinary objects and qualities are available across veridical and illusory pairs. Thus, additional presented elements must be introduced. For Kalderon, *looks* of objects or colors, conceived of as distinct from basic visible qualities or amalgams of such.¹¹ For Fish, special relational shades and perspectival shapes. And for Genone, relational, context-specific appearances. The common consequence is the rejection of Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

In the next section, we offer a different response to the Difference Argument which is fully consistent with Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

⁹ It is unclear whether on Genone’s view colors are ever seen, or merely known (see 2014: 366, fn. 34).

¹⁰ Fish explicitly endorses the Difference Principle (2009: 57, fn. 4). Kalderon and Genone do not (though see discussion of Kalderon in §6), but their accounts of illusion conform to it.

¹¹ Kalderon’s departure from Austerity is minimal insofar as his looks are *aspects* of basic visible qualities. However, they are not simply identifiable with such qualities. Kalderon rejects both Austerity and Simplicity since such looks also figure in ordinary veridical perceptions on his view.

5. Denying the Difference Principle

The Difference Principle leads both naïve realists and their critics to reject Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. Yet it is largely an unargued assumption. It is certainly not, as opponents of naïve realism often assume (e.g. Block 2010: 29), built into the very idea that mind-independent entities are character-constituting constituents of experience. We now explain how denying the Difference Principle is perfectly coherent for the naïve realist. We first present our proposal, and then develop it by responding to a series of challenges.

In voicing skepticism about Diaphaneity, Martin asks rhetorically: “why cannot the *ways* in which things are presented in experience make a difference to what the experience is like in addition to what is perceived?” (1998: 175). The idea is that even holding fixed character-constituting presented elements, experiences might still differ in the *ways* those presented elements are presented.¹² To embrace such variation is to reject the Difference Principle.

We can combine this idea with the *Appeal to Perspective*: experiences can differ in character because of differences in facts about perspective and perceptual conditions. Instead of understanding this exclusively in terms of availability, however, the naïve realist can propose that facts about perspective can make a difference to the *way* in which presented elements are presented. If so, experiences can differ in character despite *not* differing in presented elements.

¹² A similar thought can be found in Soteriou (2013: 25), Logue (2012: 222), and Beck (2019). Neither Martin nor any of these authors appeal to ways of presentation in addressing arguments from illusion as we do here. Soteriou briefly mentions this option elsewhere (2016: 188-91).

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Take Car Case. In daylight, the car looks red to *S*; under sodium streetlights, orange; and perhaps, at night, grey. Despite this, nothing other than the car and its redness need be presented to *S*.¹³ For there is no unique way of perceiving these elements. The car and its redness can shape experiential character in many different ways. There is no need to appeal to different aspects of redness to account for the variation (as in Kalderon), or to different relational “shades” (as in Fish), or to different relational appearances (as in Genone). Certainly, there is no need for represented colors or colored sense-data.

Likewise, take Window Case. Looked at from one angle, the window looks rectangular to *S*; from another angle, square; and perhaps, through distorting lenses, oval. Despite this, nothing other than the window and its rectangularity need be presented to *S*. For these elements can shape character in many different ways according to the differing circumstances of perception. Again, there is no need to appeal to different perspectival shapes or relational appearances, let alone represented shapes or shaped sense-data.

In this way, the Simple, Austere Naïve Realist can reject the Difference Principle, and hence the Difference Argument. Against it they insist that there need not be just one way of seeing a given scene. Elements can be presented, and so shape character, in many different ways, due to variation in perspectival factors. We now develop this core claim via a series of challenges.

5.1. Doesn't appealing to ways of perceiving go well beyond Simplicity and Austerity?

Simple, Austere Naïve Realism has a modest, negative ambition: to eschew any distinctive treatment of illusions, and maintain that a simple account of veridical perception is already

¹³ At least as regards car and color. Features of the surrounding perceived circumstances, such as the ambient light, will doubtless vary across most cases.

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entirely adequate. By introducing ways of perceiving into our account of illusions, have we abandoned this ambition? We have not. Appealing to ways of perceiving does not force the naïve realist to say that illusions differ from veridical cases in their relational nature, or in the kind of presented elements they involve. Furthermore, we are not appealing to ways of perceiving *specifically to account for illusions*. Veridical perceptions equally involve ways of perceiving. When *S* veridically perceives the red car, the car and its redness are not *merely* perceptually presented to *S*. They are perceptually presented visually, from such-and-such a point of view, in natural daylight, and so forth. Thus, appealing to ways of perceiving in illusions involves no distinctive new “machinery”. It conforms entirely with the Simple, Austere Naïve Realist’s modest negative ambition.

Because ways of perceiving are part of both veridical and illusory cases, the Simple, Austere Naïve Realist can also easily accommodate ordinary, non-illusory (constancy-preserving) cases of intra-individual variation in appearance. Similarly, they can accommodate Block’s claim that due to normal variation of the visual system (e.g. peak cone sensitivity and macular pigmentation), “any [color] chip is likely to look different to different people, especially those who differ in sex, race or age” (1999: 44; cf. Pautz 2017 and Brogaard 2018: 87-92). Block exploits this fact to argue against representationalism and in favor of qualia. We take such data rather to show that structural differences in the visual system can lead to different ways of veridically perceiving identical presented elements, allowing for inter-individual phenomenological variation despite sameness in presented elements.

5.2. *Isn't our view simply a three-place or third-relatum account such as offered by Campbell and Brewer?*

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The answer depends on how exactly such views should be understood. Consider, first Campbell (2009, also Campbell and Cassam 2014). Campbell notes that you can have different experiences of a complex shape (2009: 655), for example by viewing it from different angles. He thus rejects the view that “the full characterization of your experience of shape is given by saying that you bear the generic relation of consciousness to a particular three-dimensional shape” (ibid.). Instead, and like us, Campbell proposes that shapes can be experienced in different ways. Distinctively, however, Campbell unpacks this idea by analysing experience as a three-place relation between subjects, presented elements, and a third, perceptual “standpoint” relatum. This standpoint comprises multifarious factors, firstly the sense modality in question, and then corresponding factors such as the subject’s relative orientation and location.

On one interpretation, Campbell’s picture is highly congenial to Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. On this interpretation, the third-relatum serves to deny that there is a function (unique mapping) from subjects and presented elements to phenomenal characters. This is equivalent to denying the Difference Principle. Campbell goes beyond the mere denial of functionality in articulating various factors which comprise the standpoint. However, insofar as he simply aims to indicate some of the factors which affect phenomenal character over-and-above variation in presented elements, this is again congenial to our approach. We see no reason to endorse (nor attribute to Campbell) stronger commitments. For instance, that we can enumerate all possible standpoint factors, or that there exists any systematic relation between phenomenal characters and standpoints. On this interpretation, our key contribution is to extend Campbell’s account of veridical perception to illusions about which Campbell is silent.

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Campbell's account is often understood in a quite different way, however. On this understanding, the third-relatum plays an *availability* role, selecting or determining which worldly features are presented from occasion to occasion. Thus, Pautz (citing Campbell and Cassam 2014: 28) claims that Campbell's standpoint relatum "is just a matter of which external states in the scene you are acquainted with" (2017: 24). Similarly, Genone offers his Difference Principle-conforming account (discussed above) as a development of Campbell's approach (2014: 351), construing Campbell's standpoint as partially determining which relational appearance properties are perceptually available. We reject such three-place accounts given their conformity to the Difference Principle.

Brewer also proposes a three-place analysis of perceptual acquaintance (e.g. 2011: 96) which he does extend to illusions. To illustrate his approach, recall Car Case. On Brewer's picture, relevant perspectival factors, here saliently the street-lighting, constitute a third-relatum of the perceptual relation in addition to subject and presented objects. Relative to this third-relatum, Brewer holds that the car is visually similar to a paradigm orange object. This grounds the car's possession of an orange *look*. This look is not a basic visible quality, but rather a special—albeit perfectly objective—feature that the car has in relation to the street-lighting. Again, there are different ways of understanding this proposal. It is natural to think that we can be presented with the looks of things ("Did you see the look on his face?") and so to number Brewer's looks alongside ordinary objects and their basic visible features as presented elements available to shape experiential character. To do so is to assign a determinative availability role to the third-relatum in the manner of Genone's approach discussed above.

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There is, however, an alternative understanding of Brewer's view on which looks are not themselves presented elements.¹⁴ Rather, as on our view, presented elements are presented in particular ways depending on the circumstances of perception. Relative to some such set of circumstances, a given element has the objective property of being such as to present itself perceptually in a given way. On this interpretation, these properties are what Brewer calls looks. So construed, Brewer's view can be considered a version of Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.¹⁵

Our Simple, Austere Naïve Realist approach thus aligns well with existing three-place naïve realist views *on a certain minimal interpretation of them*. Indeed, minimally interpreted, we do not consider there to be any substantive difference between treating perception as a single three-place relation holding between subjects, standpoints and presented elements, or as a multiply determinable two-place relation holding between subjects and presented elements. On both treatments, there is no function from presented elements to conscious perceptual characters. And on neither view do standpoints or ways number amongst the presented elements of perception. Nonetheless, given the evident confusion and obscurity surrounding the interpretation of three-place views we avoid framing our own view in such terms.

¹⁴ Indeed, in his early writings on the Object View (e.g. 2011: 6), presented elements seem restricted entirely to physical objects. However, Brewer (2018b: 20) now explicitly admits basic visible features.

¹⁵ This interpretation fits better with Brewer's treatment of his third-relatum as a constitutive aspect of perceptual experience (2011: 100, fn. 5). If the third-relatum played an availability role, a constitutive treatment would be puzzling. The relatum would be constitutive of a certain relational property, but unless constitution were transitive, this would not suffice to make it constitutive of experience itself. In contrast, if the third-relatum marks an ineliminable additional dimension of variation in the phenomenal nature of acquaintance, then it makes sense to conceive of it constitutively.

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5.3. *Isn't our view just a form of adverbialism?*

The adverbialist holds that “having a visual experience is a matter of sensing in a certain manner” (Tye 1984: 195-196). This provides them with a simple account of illusions. Of Car Case, for instance, the adverbialist will hold that even though there is nothing orange perceptually presented to *S*, *S* “senses orangely” – that is, senses in an orange manner or way – and this is what accounts for the character of *S*'s experience.

Our approach differs from the adverbialist approach in two important respects. First, the adverbialist denies that *S* senses *the car* or *the car's redness*, and senses *it* orangely. The adverbialist holds merely that *S* senses in an *orange way*. Nothing is presented to *S* which is constitutive of the character of *S*'s experience (Tye 1984: 196). Rather, the adverbialist *replaces* character-constituting presented elements with adverbially-specified ways of sensing. In appealing to ways of perceiving, we are absolutely not suggesting that they *replace* character-constituting presented elements. In Car Case, if we stripped away the presented elements no experience specifiable simply in terms of the way of perceiving in question will be left. Ways of perceiving, as we conceive of them, lack such independence from presented elements. They are not the adverbialist's intransitive ways of sensing but transitive ways of *being acquainted with character-constituting presented elements*. There is no such thing as *merely* perceiving under sodium streetlights (French 2014: 411).¹⁶

Second, we reject the characterization of ways of perceiving in terms of the perceptible qualities which specify the character of the experience in question. We deny, for instance, that there is such a thing as an orange, or rectangular way of perceiving, or a way of perceiving

¹⁶ None of this precludes absences counting amongst the presented elements of experience (Sorensen 2008). To perceive an absence is not merely to perceive (Phillips 2013).

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or angularly or rectangularly. Rather, we specify ways of perceiving indirectly by reference to perspectival factors, including external factors such as the illumination conditions, and internal factors such as the perceptual modality involved (and even structural facts about perceptual systems).

In this way, we diverge from Beck's (2019) conception of "ways of presentation". Unlike the adverbialist, Beck maintains that mind-independent presented elements are constitutive of character (at least in veridical experience). However, in other respects his account is similar to the adverbialist's. Beck thinks: (1) that ways are specifiable in terms of relevant perceptible qualities, and (2) that ways make an entirely independent contribution to character. He thus holds that "you can be appeared to in a roundish way in both a perception and in a hallucination" (627).

Contra (1), we deny that ways of perceiving are specifiable in terms of perceptible qualities. Contra (2), we deny that ways of perceiving make a wholly independent and separable contribution to phenomenology. Ways of perceiving in our sense cannot account for the phenomenology of hallucination in the way that Beck takes them to.¹⁷ The way of perceiving in Car Case, associated with perceiving under sodium streetlights, cannot be lifted out of that context to account for an hallucination as of something orange. It is not a matter of "perceiving

¹⁷ In holding that "ways of presentation" are shared across veridical perceptions and causally matching hallucinations, Beck attempts to reconcile naïve realism with a common factor approach to perceptual experience. We deny that hallucinations can be given any such positive characterization (Martin 2004). We also deny Beck's claim that ways of presentation are completely determined by "neuro-computational properties" (625). Neuro-computational factors may figure amongst the perspectival factors which generate different ways of perceiving. But they do not exhaust such factors, nor exhaustively determine such ways.

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orangely” or “being appeared to in an orangeish way”. Insofar as it helps to explain why things look orange to *S*, this is not independent of the presentation of redness to *S* in the specific context in question. It does not *itself* bring orangeness into the mix in the way that “perceiving orangely” or “being appeared to in orangeish way” does. Indeed, perceiving in a way associated with sodium streetlights has no intrinsic connection to orangeness at all: one could perceive a blue car and it look green to one under such illumination conditions.

5.4. *Isn't our view just a version of the Theory of Appearing?*

Again, no, and for similar reasons. Consider *S*'s veridical experience of the red car as red. According to the Theory of Appearing, the color character of this experience is to be understood in terms of a relation between *S* and the car: the relation of “appearing red” (Langsam 1997: 36). But what about Car Case? Well here, presumably, the proponent of the Theory of Appearing will hold that *S* bears a different relation to the car, namely that of “appearing orange”. Phenomenal character is thus understood in terms of ways of being related to mind-independent objects, appearing red being one, appearing orange another. These ways are *not* detachable from character-constituting presented elements as the adverbialist's ways are. They are relations between subjects and the mind-independent objects they perceive. Because of this, they also differ from Beck's ways; they are not present in cases of hallucination (Langsam: 37-41).¹⁸

Nonetheless, such relations of appearing *are* specifiable in terms of perceptible features, and so differ from our ways of perceiving. In Car Case, the proponent of the Theory of Appearing

¹⁸ As a result, Langsam adopts a disjunctivist account of hallucinations. Alston (1999: 191-192) develops his theory of appearing differently by claiming that (certain) hallucinations are relations of appearing between subjects and *mental images*.

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will appeal to a specific way of being related to the car: the relation of appearing *orange*. We too appeal to a specific way of being related to the car, but this is not the relation of appearing orange, it is a matter of perceiving the car in such-and-such circumstances, i.e. *under sodium streetlights* etc. To repeat, perceiving the car in such a way has no intrinsic connection to orangeness at all: one could perceive a blue car and it look green to one under such illumination conditions.

Finally, our view differs from the view proposed recently by Johnston (2011, 2014) which he explicitly aligns with the Theory of Appearing (2011: 172). Johnston aims to give an account of what he calls “attentive sensory episodes” (ASEs), such as *S*’s looking at a red car. Such an episode not only involves *S* being related to an object of perception, but what Johnston calls a “manner of presentation”. According to Johnston, we perceive the objects of ASEs under manners of presentation. And episodes which involve the same object, can differ thanks to a difference in manner of presentation. Johnston even exploits such manners of presentation in discussing illusions. One might think, then, that our view is a variant of Johnston’s.

However, there is a critical difference. In line with adverbialists, Beck and the Theory of Appearing, Johnston understands manners of presentation in terms of perceptible features. Furthermore, to provide an account of illusions, Johnston holds that an object “may or may not conform to its manner of presentation” (2011: 173).

Think of an innocent looking at the “bent” pencil. What makes one of the ASEs he is enjoying illusory is this: the item that is the object of that ASE, e.g., the pencil, fails to match the mode of presentation that is constitutive of the ASE, the three-dimensional curved-shape (2011: 195).

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Here, Johnston treats the ASE's manner of presentation in terms of a perceptible feature (shape). The case is an illusion because this shape mischaracterizes the ASE's object: "Token ASEs are non-veridical if and only if their manners of presentation mischaracterize their objects; they are veridical if and only if their manners of presentation correctly characterize their objects." (2014: 129)

In contrast, as emphasized above, our ways of perceiving are not specifiable in terms of perceptible features. Nor do they characterize (or mischaracterize) the objects of experience. These points are related. Our ways of perceiving, are not *characteristics*. The way of perceiving involved in Car Case is perceiving *under sodium streetlights*. There is no question of it (figuring in experience as) characterizing or mischaracterizing the perceived car, nor of the car conforming to or matching the way we perceive it.

At this juncture, we have said a great deal about ways of perceiving. Yet we have left unaddressed an important question. In Car Case *orangeness* isn't instantiated in the environment that *S* perceives. Yet the car looks *orange* to *S*. So:

5.5. *How does orangeness get into the picture? Why does the car look orange to S?*

Orange enters the adverbialist picture via the mode of sensing. It enters Beck's version of naïve realism via his independently specifiable ways of presentation. It enters via the relation of appearing orange according to the Theory of Appearing. And it enters into the manner of presentation on Johnston's view. But how does our view get orangeness into the picture, given that we explicitly deny that ways of perceiving amount to "sensing orangely", or similar?

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To address this question, we draw on Martin's (2010) discussion of looks (especially his discussion of the bent stick, 195-222). Following Martin, the Simple, Austere Naïve Realist can say that, under sodium streetlights, the car has a feature—a look—which is relevantly similar to the paradigm look of an orange thing.

What are looks? If looks are special properties, not identifiable with basic visible qualities, then though we haven't yet said that they are presented elements, we are veering away from the modesty of Simplicity and Austerity. To avoid this, we claim that the feature of the car which is relevantly similar to the paradigm look of an orange thing just is the car's actual color, its redness. Moreover, we claim that the paradigm look of an orange thing simply is its orangeness. Thus, the car looks orange because of a similarity between two basic visible properties, viz. redness and orangeness, a similarity made salient in the relevant conditions. More generally, our Simple, Austere Naïve Realist appeals to Martin's *Parsimonious* account of looks, on which looks are simply basic visible qualities: "size, shape, colour, visible texture, spatial arrangement of parts" (207) – or constructions out of these.¹⁹

For this view to pass muster, the car's red color must be relevantly similar to orangeness. But in what way is redness similar to orangeness? The answer is that in the circumstances of Car Case the subject looking at the red car will be inclined to find the actual color of the car before her as more like orangeness than anything else. Thus, the psychological impact that the red color of the car has on the subject in Car Case is similar to the psychological impact that the orange color of a car has on a subject who sees it in natural daylight – a paradigmatic

¹⁹ For ease of exposition we focus just on the car's color, but in general the look of an object which is relevantly similar to the paradigm look of an orange object may involve a more complex construction out of its basic visible properties. Pointilliste paintings arguably provide a good example of such a case.

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circumstance for encountering orangeness. On such a subjective measure of similarity the red color of the car is relevantly similar to orangeness. Consequently, the car's orange look can be identified with its red color (cf. Martin 2010: 215).²⁰

Although orangeness is now in the picture, it remains to explain where the salient subjective similarity arises from. Why, under sodium streetlights, does the red color of the car strike *S* as being more like being orange than anything else? Of course, our account will point to *the way* in which the car and its redness are perceived. But the explanatory demand is to go beyond this structural characterization. Why does being bathed in sodium streetlight mean that redness is perceived in a way such that it strikes *S* as more like orange than its actual color?

Here (and despite disagreeing with aspects of his metaphysics of looks) Brewer's discussion is valuable. According to Brewer:

visually relevant similarities are similarities by the lights of visual processing of various kinds. Objects have visually relevant similarities when they share sufficiently many common properties amongst those that have a significant involvement in the various processes underlying vision. Thus, and very crudely, visually relevant similarities are identities in such things as the way in which light is reflected and transmitted from the objects in question, and the way in which stimuli are handled by the visual system, given its evolutionary history and our shared training during development (2011: 103).

²⁰ A consequence of this parsimonious view is that the red car has an orange look even in natural daylight. Objects only change their appearance when they change their basic visible qualities. This may seem like an unattractive consequence since it means that "the car looks orange" is true of the car as it is in natural daylight. Martin argues that the proponent of Parsimony can meet this objection by explaining why "the car looks orange" is not *assertible* in the context of natural daylight, even if it is true (218-222, discussing the bent-stick).

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The Simple, Austere Naïve Realist can hold that under sodium streetlights the red color of the car is similar in some of the above respects to a paradigmatic instance of orangeness in natural daylight. Specifically, suppose (purely for the purpose of illustration) that the car's redness is a matter of its having a certain surface reflectance profile. And suppose that the product of the interaction of sodium streetlight with this profile which is incident at the retina is closely matched with the product of the interaction of natural daylight with the surface reflectance profile of a paradigm orange object. Because of this match in light incident at the retina, the redness of the car in Car Case is liable to strike *S* as more like orangeness than anything else.

This is not to retract what we've said about the car's orange look. The car's orange look is simply its red color (*contra* Brewer). This is relevantly similar to orangeness given a subjective measure of similarity. What Brewer offers us, however, is a deeper explanation of this subjective similarity: of why the car's redness strikes *S* as like orangeness when perceived under sodium streetlights. In general, these explanations will be piecemeal and highly contingent on relevant vision science. Why subjects are inclined to classify stimuli as they are, as bent despite being straight, as moving when still, or as concave when convex are matters for empirical investigation and, in many cases, ongoing controversy. Our aim is not to provide such explanations, only to show how such explanations are quite consistent with Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

We can pull these ideas together in responding to the reader who asks exactly what ways of perceiving are and how they contribute to phenomenal character. In the first instance, to talk of ways is simply to insist that there is no function from presented elements to phenomenal characters. This is essentially a structural claim: we can see one and the same scene in different

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ways. Nothing more informative can be said about ways at this level of generality. There is no general answer to how scenes and circumstances of perception interact to settle the way the scene is seen, and so fix character. In particular cases of perception, however, we can fruitfully ask: why does the way in which the subject perceives the scene affect the phenomenal character of their experience as it does? Our answer here will advert to how the various elements of the scene strike the subject, given the way they are perceived—and in particular to the visually relevant subjective similarities and differences with paradigm cases of perception. To understand why these subjective similarities and differences obtain we will, in part, need to look to empirical work on visual processing—at psychological and neurophysiological levels of explanation.

There remains one final challenge to confront.

5.6. Don't we risk introducing a common factor into explanations of phenomenology which conflicts with the core commitments of naïve realism?

We have explained why the red car looks orange by appealing to a similarity in how redness perceived one way and orangeness perceived another strike us. We accounted for this similarity by appealing to the similarity of proximal input to our visual system. But if how things strike us is explicable in terms of something common across such cases, then there would seem to be pressure to positively characterize the phenomenological situation common to both cases. For familiar reasons we are resistant to doing so (see Martin 2004, 2006).

The pressure towards a common factor is resistible. To see this we need to remember that subjective similarities can obtain without qualitative identity. Thus, an orange car perceived in daylight and a red car perceived in streetlight may elicit similar experiential states without those

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states being qualitatively identical. In particular, the naïve realist will insist that the states are qualitatively distinct in having their characters partially grounded in orangeness in one case and redness in the other. Nonetheless, they are similar in that both provoke matching classificatory inclinations.

Consider a specific version of Car Case where the proximal input is, by stipulation, exactly the same under sodium illumination as it is in some non-illusory daylight case. Given naturalistic assumptions, such a case will involve a perceptual state which is not knowably not a case of orange car seeing. We will thus have an experience as of an orange car (given the treatment of experience in Martin 2004). However, there is no pressure here to characterize the experience purely negatively (as Martin argues we must characterize a corresponding hallucination). For we can positively characterize the state in terms of the red car seen in a certain (sodium street-lit) way. It is true that we have the same *experience* across these veridical and illusory cases. But as is familiar from disjunctivist approaches to hallucination, such experiences do not constitute a *fundamental* experiential kind. Rather the experience in one case will be fundamentally one of seeing a red car in sodium light, the experience in the other case will be fundamentally one of seeing an orange car in daylight.²¹

6. Arguments for the Difference Principle

Rejecting the Difference Principle is a coherent and attractive strategy for the Simple, Austere Naïve Realist. However, it remains to consider whether anything might be said in favor of it. In the absence of explicit arguments in the literature, we offer two arguments inspired by

²¹ We do not mean here to take a stand on whether experience presents high-level categories such as *carhood*. A reader disinclined towards this view can think of the fundamental kind as seeing a red car-sized and shaped object in sodium light, and seeing an orange car-sized and shaped object in daylight.

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standard defenses of pure intentionalism: the view that phenomenal character supervenes on (or is determined by, or even identical with) representational content. We also identify a third epistemic argument for a principle close to the Difference Principle. These arguments may explain why some naïve realists cleave to the principle. Their failure frees them to reject it.

The most familiar consideration adduced in support of pure intentionalism is the so-called transparency of experience. Thus, Tye:

[I]ntrospection of your perceptual experiences seems to reveal only aspects of what you experience, further aspects of the scenes, as represented. Why? The answer, I suggest, is that your perceptual experiences have no introspectible features over and above those implicated in their intentional contents. So the phenomenal character of such experiences ... is identical with, or contained within, their intentional contents. (1995: 136)

We can offer a parallel defense of the Difference Principle:

Introspection of your perceptual experiences seems to reveal only aspects of what you experience, further aspects of the scenes, as presented. Why? The answer is that your perceptual experiences have no introspectible features over and above their character-constituting presented elements. So the phenomenal character of such experiences is wholly constituted by their presented elements.²²

Tye's introspective claim is notoriously controversial. Nonetheless, in the present context, a more concessive reply is available. For the naïve realist can agree with the following

²² Strictly, this last claim is stronger than our minimal, modal formulation of the Difference Principle.

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transparency thesis: introspection of your perceptual experience inevitably involves attention to presented elements. After all, the naïve realist can happily allow that all aspects of experience are *scene-involving*, being relations between subjects and presented elements (Soteriou 2013: 88). What the naïve realist who rejects the Difference Principle must deny is that aspects of a scene can only be perceived in one way. However, it is obscure how transparency considerations could establish such a strong claim. How could the fact that introspective reflection inevitably lands upon aspects of the presented scene establish that such aspects could only shape conscious character in one way?

Debates about transparency and intentionalism standardly pit the pure intentionalist against the believer in qualia or mental paint. Their dispute is said to represent the “greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind” (Block 1996: 19). Here, “mental paint” refers to intrinsic properties of experiences in virtue of which they represent externalia. The dispute between transparency and qualia theorists concerns whether we are aware of any such features. The naïve realist conceives of perception as an essentially relational phenomenon. As a result, they will eschew mental paint so conceived (Campbell 2009: 659). Nonetheless, there is a weaker, more general notion of mental paint which qualia theorists also employ and in relation to which they occupy common ground with the Difference Principle-denying naïve realist. According to this weaker notion, to believe in mental paint is simply to believe that “representationally identical experiences might be phenomenally different” (Block 1996: 548). The Difference Principle-denying naïve realist will agree that there is mental paint in this minimal sense. As they will put the thought: experiences can be phenomenally different despite sharing precisely the same presented elements.

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Far from being confounded by transparency considerations, then, the Difference Principle-denying naïve realist offers a happy compromise between those on either side of Block's great chasm. For, on the one hand, our naïve realist can agree with Tye that transparency tells against our being aware of intrinsic (i.e. non-relational) features of our experience. On the other hand, our naïve realist can agree with Block that there are differences in phenomenal character which do not involve differences in the presented scene.²³

Byrne (2001) offers a second well-known argument for pure intentionalism. Byrne's argument distills to two simple claims: first, that there cannot be a change in the phenomenal character of someone's experience without a change in the way the world seems to them; second, that there cannot be a change in the way the world seems to someone in experience without a difference in representational content.²⁴ It follows that there can be no changes in phenomenal character without corresponding changes in representational content. Again, we can convert this argument into an argument for the Difference Principle. The first claim remains unaltered. The second claim becomes: there cannot be a change in the way the world seems to someone in experience without a difference in *presented elements*. The Difference Principle follows.

²³ Much ink has been spilt debating putative counter-examples to pure intentionalism (e.g. Peacocke 1983, Tye 1995: 155-159). Some intentionalist responses to such putative counter-examples parallel ways in which naïve realists such as Fish and Genone have sought to block arguments from illusion (e.g. Tye 2002: 453 on the representation of viewpoint-relative size). The possibility of making such moves in either case makes the counter-example strategy appear unpromising. Nonetheless, we are sympathetic to many such counter-examples. They reveal how strong and unnatural an assumption the Difference Principle is.

²⁴ See further Thau 2002: 30-33, and also Siegel 2012: chpt. 2.

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Byrne focuses on defending his argument's first claim, taking his second claim to be obvious.

Thus, "Premise B" of Byrne's argument runs:

Assume that a subject enjoys an experience e that ends at t and then experience e^* , and that after t the subject notices a change in phenomenal character, solely on the basis of her current experience e^* and the (perfect) memory produced by her past experience e . Then the way things seem to the subject when she enjoys e differs from the way things seem when she enjoys e^* . That is, the content of e differs from the content of e^* . (210)

Here, in the final step (as elsewhere), Byrne simply equates the way things seem when a subject is enjoying her experience with the content of that experience. Opponents of pure intentionalism will likely balk.

Byrne's "Premise B" has a natural naïve realist analogue: simply replace "content" by "character-constituting presented elements" in the final sentence. Analogously, this argument simply assumes that if there is a difference between two experiences in the ways things seem to their subjects, there must be a difference in presented elements. Here the Difference Principle-denying naïve realist will balk, for to assume this is not to argue for the Difference Principle but bluntly to assert it.

Lastly, we consider an explicit defense by a naïve realist of a principle close to the Difference Principle. Kalderon (2008) considers a case of color perception in which a normal perceiver, Norm, sees a garment (say some red trousers) in two different lighting conditions. Because of metamerism, in the fluorescent storelight, Norm cannot tell which of two reds the trousers are. Bringing them into daylight he comes to know which. (Whilst not a case of illusion, the structure of the case parallels one in which the store illumination does elicit an illusion.)

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Unusually, Kalderon explicitly countenances the idea of rejecting the Difference Principle: “Perhaps the way something is presented in experience, as well as what’s presented, can make for a phenomenal difference.” (2008: 955) Moreover, he denies that we can conclusively establish “the general claim that a difference in the phenomenal character of experience suffices for a difference in what is present in that experience.” (956; see also 2011c: 241) Nonetheless, he insists that we should not understand the case of Norm in terms of variation in the way one and the same color is presented. Instead, we must think of Norm as seeing different aspects of the color in the two conditions (as discussed above, and in conformity with the Difference Principle). Why?

[T]he phenomenal difference between Norm’s colour experience in the shop and in daylight must be due to presentational difference if it is to have the positive epistemic significance it must have if on the basis of these phenomenally distinct experiences Norm could come to know which colour he is perceiving. (2008: 956)

What is obscure here is why only presentational differences could yield “positive epistemic significance”. Suppose, *pace* Kalderon, that the phenomenal difference between storelight and daylight is a matter of the way Norm perceives the garment’s color as a result of the prevailing illumination conditions. Why should this mean that the epistemic difference between Norm’s situations in and out of the store cannot be captured? Why can’t it be that in some illumination conditions (perceiving the garment one way), Norm is able to know which color it is, whereas in others, he is not? Perhaps some ways of perceiving are epistemically superior to others, enabling us to know more precisely what is presented to us (cf. Brewer 2018: §5).²⁵

²⁵ Compare recent discussions of perceptual confidence. Munton (2016), for example, considers a pair of cases in which a subject is confronted with the same scene in and out of fog. She argues that the subject’s differential

Kalderon's argument closely resembles a very widely held view about perception and consciousness, given voice by Byrne in the following passage.

Accounts of phenomenal character divide on a fault line between *presentationalists* and *sensationalists*. Presentationalists think that phenomenal character is solely a matter of the subject's *awareness* (or better, *ostensible awareness*) of his environment.... According to presentationalists, th[e] presented segment of reality fixes the phenomenal character of [one's] experience. ... Sensationalists deny that this is all there is to phenomenal character. They usually base their case on alleged examples where the presented segment of reality remains constant while phenomenal character changes....

If sensationalism is true, then the phenomenal character of an experience can to some extent float free from the segment of reality the experience (ostensibly) presents, and so its relevance to the epistemic status of beliefs about that segment is entirely unclear. This is why Smithies, a prominent defender of the epistemic relevance of phenomenal character, writes that:

It is because perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of confronting one with objects and properties in the world around me that it justifies forming beliefs about those objects and properties. (2014: 103) (Byrne 2016: 956-7; emphasis in original)

epistemic standing derives from a difference in experience best explained by the hypothesis that "visual states comprise not only a content, but a confidence relation to that content" (301). Without commitment to there being confidence relations, our Simple, Austere Naïve Realist will agree with Munton here that the same scene can be experienced in different ways, some placing us in stronger epistemic positions than others. That said, Morrison's development of a closely related view on which "some veridical experiences involve relations to objects that are absent (or even non-existent)" (2016: 44) is plainly inimical to naïve realism.

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In this passage Byrne conflates two critically different ideas. First, that “phenomenal character is solely a matter of the subject’s *awareness* (or better, *ostensible* awareness) of his environment”. Second, that phenomenal character is fixed simply by the segment of reality a subject is aware of. As discussed at length, the first claim does not entail the second. The Difference Principle can be rejected. Once this is seen, the epistemic objection to the idea of phenomenal variation despite an unchanging presented scene lapses. For whilst understanding such changes in terms of features (splotches of mental paint or sensation) which “float free” from reality understandably induces epistemic anxiety, understanding such changes in terms of the different ways reality can present itself does not. It is quite consistent with Smithies’ thought that only experience with the phenomenal character of confrontation can have epistemic bearing.

Three potential considerations in favor of the Difference Principle have been found wanting. Absent stronger arguments, the naïve realist should feel no compunction in discarding it. So unburdened, the naïve realist is freed to endorse a particularly simple account of both veridical perception and illusion: Simple, Austere Naïve Realism.

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