introductions by the editors are not only very useful, they are sharp, pointed overview contributions, and they provide much more detailed information about what is in there than a review like this does. The reader who thinks there might be something here is well advised to read the introductions and take it from there.

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Bernecker’s Memory offers a detailed and erudite philosophical study of propositional memory. Chapter one rejects the orthodox tripartite classification of memory into the propositional, experiential, and practical; replaces it with a purely grammatical taxonomy; and offers a novel analysis of propositional memory. Chapter two argues that propositional memory does not logically entail diachronic subject identity. Chapter three argues that propositional memory entails neither belief nor justification, and so cannot be conceived of as knowledge preserved. The second half of the book comprises a defence and lengthy exploration first of a causal theory of memory (chapters four and five), and then of externalism about memory contents (chapters six and seven). Chapter eight defends what Bernecker calls the entailment thesis according to which one can remember a proposition $p$ even though one has never previously represented $p$ as true, so long as one has previously represented a $p$-entailing proposition as true. Chapter nine contains a few closing remarks as well as a helpful statement of Bernecker’s final analysis of the nature of memory.

As this summary makes apparent, Bernecker’s focus is firmly on philosophical issues concerning propositional memory. Thus, he explicitly sets aside non-propositional forms of memory, and, for the most part, declines to engage with the cognitive science of memory. Nonetheless, Bernecker’s agenda is admirably and unashamedly ambitious. If he were successful, he would have radically reshaped the philosophical terrain. However, though Bernecker is successful in places (for instance, in his robust defence of externalism about memory in the face of slow switching objections), Bernecker’s arguments do not always match his ambition. Here I focus on two of Bernecker’s key foundational claims by way of illustration.
1. Taxonomy

Traditionally, memories are divided into the propositional (or factual), experiential (or personal), and practical (or procedural). The propositional/experiential distinction is naturally identified, though in Bernecker’s view wrongly, with Tulving’s semantic/episodic distinction more familiar from empirical work. Bernecker’s bold opening claim is that the traditional distinction between propositional and experiential memory is a muddle.

Bernecker’s first reason is that we cannot appeal to phenomenology to mark out experiential memories because of the dramatic variation in imaging abilities amongst subjects (p. 16). The argument is not spelt out, but it appears to be that, since some subjects lack imagery (as shown by Galton’s pioneering studies) yet possess experiential memory, experiential memory cannot be supposed to involve mental imagery. However, Galton’s work (and the vast majority of subsequent work on variation in imaging ability) focuses solely on visual imagery. Bernecker thus offers no data for the highly controversial claim that there are subjects who lack all forms of imagery. Furthermore, Bernecker offers no support for the claim that subjects without visual imagery have the capacity for visual experiential memory. Thus, Bernecker offers no evidence against the thesis that experiential memory in a given modality requires some capacity for imagery in that modality, and so no evidence against an essentially phenomenological approach to experiential memory.

Bernecker’s second reason for denying that there is any hard and fast distinction between experiential and propositional memory is that the traditional grammatical criterion for distinguishing the two is inadequate (pp. 17–18). According to that criterion, propositional memory is reported in the form ‘S remembers that p’, and experiential memory in the form ‘S remembers [x] f-ing’. Against this, Bernecker holds that one can experientially remember that so-and-so happened. His example is remembering that last summer you spent a few days in Rome. According to Bernecker the (not uncommon) denial of this possibility ‘is too implausible to be acceptable’ (p. 18). A concessive reply to this claim allows that experiential memories are sometimes reportable with a propositional complement, but holds that they are nonetheless marked out from propositional memories in being uniquely reportable with a gerundive complement. A less concessive response maintains that experiential memories are never properly reportable in propositional form, diagnosing Bernecker’s example and charge of implausibility by noting that, in certain contexts, reports of propositional memories imply or implicate that the subject has relevant experiential memories.

Bernecker goes on to offer an exclusively grammatical taxonomy of forms of memory, denying that phenomenology has any essential role to play in distinguishing propositional and non-propositional memory. What is more, he holds that we can simply translate memory reports with a gerundive
complement into reports with a propositional complement without loss (p. 21). However, it is natural to think that a report such as ‘Sylvie recalls her first sky-dive’ tracks a phenomenological feature by picking out an event formerly witnessed by Sylvie and which now, in recollection, she comes consciously to reacquaint herself with. In contrast, the propositional form does not track such a feature, but only the fact that such-and-such an occurrence took place. As a result, an advocate of the traditional taxonomy might well complain that Bernecker’s seemingly novel position collapses into the traditional picture, since the grammatical criterion Bernecker endorses carries phenomenological baggage which cannot so easily be discarded.

2. Epistemicism

A traditional conception of memory treats memory as the preservation of epistemic success. Propositional memory, according to the standard version of this view, is simply ‘the maintenance of knowledge formerly acquired by whatever means’ (M. Dummett, ‘Testimony and Memory’, in his Seas of Language, Oxford: OUP, 1993, p. 421). A less standard version — which Bernecker does not mention — is that propositional memory is the maintenance of one’s position to know. (This less standard version is arguably better able to handle his cases of temporary epistemic defeat at p. 74f., and is therefore a better partner to the simple retention theory which Bernecker critiques in §4.2.) Bernecker’s aim in chapter three is to provide a refutation of epistemicism, a result which informs much of the rest of the book (not least his rejection of evidential retention theory and defence of a causal theory of memory in chapter four).

Bernecker’s approach is to provide a wealth of alleged counter-examples targeted at different aspects and varieties of epistemicism. Proper consideration of each of these interesting examples would require space well beyond the scope of a brief review. But I am sceptical that such counter-examples ultimately force the epistemicist to cede ground: sometimes it is simply unclear that we should accept Bernecker’s own verdicts about the relevant cases; sometimes the examples presuppose philosophical views which the epistemicist can simply reject; sometimes the counter-examples are too underdeveloped to be assessable properly.

Take the epistemicist’s claim that remembering that \( p \) entails being presently justified in believing that \( p \). One of Bernecker’s several counter-examples (pp. 80–1) is a fake barn case in which intuitively \( S \) remembers that there was a barn but, according to a Nozick-style tracking account, lacks justification and knowledge. The difficulty is that the case is one in which it is no less intuitive to think that \( S \) knows that there was a barn. This is precisely why Kripke offers the case against simple tracking accounts (as Bernecker notes at fn. 8, p. 80). Given this, it is difficult to see how Bernecker could conceive of the case as a real challenge to epistemicism, as
opposed to a previously identified challenge to tracking accounts. Similarly, Bernecker’s next alleged counter-example (pp. 81–2) simply takes it for granted that we are never justified in rejecting sceptical hypotheses, treating it as beyond dispute, for instance, that ‘[t]he testimony of historians and archeologists … is not good reason to believe that there is a past’ (p. 82). Bernecker perhaps succeeds in highlighting the implausibility of such epistemological theses, but why the epistemacist should be burdened with them is never explained.

Another alleged counter-example runs as follows. At $t_1$, you come justifiably, but falsely, to believe that Simon has borrowed Caesar’s *Gallic War Commentaries*. By $t_2$, your belief has decayed into the more generic belief that Simon has borrowed some or other book by Caesar. This belief is in fact true since Simon borrowed Caesar’s *Civil War Commentaries*. Bernecker rightly holds that this belief is not justified. However he asks, ‘Can your [unjustified] belief qualify as memory? We should, I reckon … answer in the affirmative’ (p. 74). If Bernecker is right, we have a case of memory without justified belief or knowledge. However, the plausibility of Bernecker’s verdict depends on how we fill out the case. Moreover, once we do so it is no longer clear that we have a case of memory without knowledge after all.

Imagine first that you justifiably but falsely believe that Simon has borrowed Caesar’s *Gallic War Commentaries* because you clearly saw Simon carry out a *Commentary* by Caesar from the library, and then subsequently asked the normally reliable librarian which one he had borrowed and were misinformed. In such a case it is far from clear that you do not simply know throughout the case that Simon has borrowed a book by Caesar, despite being wrong about which: you saw that he did after all. Thus, at $t_2$, there is no reason to doubt that you both know and remember this fact.

Imagine in contrast that you form your false belief because you saw Simon take a book out of the library whose dust jacket read: *Commentaries on the Gallic War*, but was unbeknownst to you a copy of *Harry Potter* in disguise. If you forget the exact *Commentary* named on the dust jacket but continue to believe that Simon borrowed a book by Caesar it is extremely doubtful that you count as remembering that he did, even if Simon in fact went back later that day when you had gone home and borrowed a different *Commentary* by Caesar thus making the belief accidentally true. Here again we have a case where remembering stands and falls with knowing.

I have only considered a handful of the many stimulating examples that Bernecker offers. And, of course, just one needs to succeed for the epistemic view to be shown to be in error. However, given the absence of a convincing account as to why epistemicism has so long been endorsed by so many distinguished figures, if it is thoroughly mistaken (witness the pantheon Bernecker lists at fn. 1, p. 66), it would not be unreasonable of the epistemacist to remain sanguine.
Furthermore, these concerns about the success of Bernecker’s case against the traditional conception of propositional memory have implications for Bernecker’s project as a whole, for they problematise his neglect of non-propositional forms of memory. If the traditional distinction between propositional memory and experiential memory is robust, and propositional memory is properly thought of as knowledge retained, then the real and distinctive interest in memory as opposed simply to knowledge emerges only in its experiential form.

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In his Soliloquies Augustine offers an argument which may be paraphrased like this:

Suppose there are no truths. Then it’s a truth that there are no truths. So there’s at least one truth. So there’s at least one truth.

That nice piece of reasoning involves something which the Greeks called a ρεριτροπή or reversal. There are dozens of things like it in ancient philosophical texts. Scholars tend to refer to them as self-refutation arguments, and so Luca Castagnoli says of his book about reversals that it ‘aims to provide a comprehensive survey and analysis of the history and logic of ancient self-refutation’ from the beginning to the age of Augustine (p. 2). The survey, which considers more than a hundred texts, divides into three parts: part one deals with arguments which turn about the notions of truth and falsehood; part two discusses ‘pragmatic, ad hominem and operational self-refutation’; and part three concerns itself with scepticism and self-refutation. The texts are given in English translation, the Greek or Latin sitting at the foot of the page. The arguments are filleted, gutted, boned, and battered. The views of other scholars are taken into account, and they too are often battered.

The book is long, its constitutive analyses are intricate, and there is little by way of light relief. But scholars expect to slog; and anyone who has a passing