Papers

A change of perspective: Naïve realism and normal variation, in O. Beck & F. Masrour (eds) The Relational View of Perception: New Essays Routledge, forthcoming, with Craig French.
Visual adaptation and the purpose of perception, Analysis, in press; with Chaz Firestone. Final draft. (Ned Block replies in Adaptation, Signal Detection and the Purposes of Perception: Reply to Ian Phillips and Chaz Firestone, Analysis, forthcoming.)
The perception of silence, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(29), 2023; with Rui Zhe Goh and Chaz Firestone. (Data and demos.)
Eccentricity advances arrival to visual perception, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152(6), 2023; with Adi Upadhyayula and Jonathan Flombaum.
Naïve realism, the slightest philosophy, and the slightest science, in B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (eds) Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, 2023; with Craig French.
Bias and blindsight: a reply to Michel and Lau (2021), Psychological Review, 128(3), 2021. (This is a reply to Matthias Michel and Hakwan Lau's Is blindsight possible under signal detection theory? Comment on Phillips (2021) which replies to the paper below.)
Blindsight is qualitatively degraded conscious vision, Psychological Review, 128(3), 2021.
Scepticism about unconscious perception is the default hypothesis, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28(3-4), 2021.
Austerity and Illusion, Philosophers' Imprint, 20(15), 2020; with Craig French.
Making sense of blindsense: a commentary on Garric et al. 2019, Cortex, 127, 2020. (This is a reply to Garric et al. Dissociation between objective and subjective perceptual experiences in a population of hemianopic patients: A new form of blindsight? Cortex 177, 2019.)
Object files and unconscious perception: a reply to Quilty-Dunn, Analysis, 80(2), 2020. (This is a reply to Jake Quilty-Dunn's paper Unconscious perception and phenomenal coherence.)
The fundamental problem with no-cognition paradigms, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24(3), 2020; with Jorge Morales. (This is a reply to Ned Block's What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23, 2019. He replies to us in: Finessing the bored monkey problem, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24, 2020.)
The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 373(1755), 2018.
Unconscious perception reconsidered, Analytic Philosophy, 59(4), 2018. (A very early ancestor of this paper won the Antwerp Centre for Philosophical Psychology's Annual Essay Prize.)
No more than meets the eye: shadows as pure visibilia, in C. Mac Cumhaill & T. Crowther (eds) Perceptual Ephemera OUP, 2018. Official version here.
Consciousness, time, and memory, in R. J. Gennaro (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, Routledge, 2018. Official version here.
Commentary on A. Haun, G. Tononi, C. Koch & N. Tsuchiya ‘Are we underestimating the richness of visual experience?’ Neuroscience of Consciousness 3(1), The Brains Blog, April 2018.
Does unconscious perception really exist? — a debate with Ned Block, Bob Kentridge, Megan Peters and myself, Neuroscience of Consciousness 3(1), 2017.
Commentary on S. Gross & J. Flombaum ‘Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access? The challenge from probabilistic, hierarchical processes’ Mind & Language 32(3), The Brains Blog, June 2017.
Debate on unconscious perception, with Ned Block, in B. Nanay (ed.) Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception Routledge, 2016.
Consciousness and criterion: on Block's case for unconscious perception, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research XCIII(2), 2016. (Ned Block's reply: The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious Perception, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XCIII(2), 2016.)
No watershed for overflow: recent work on the richness of consciousness, Philosophical Psychology 29(2), 2016.
Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions, Philosophical Topics 44(2), 2016, special issue on Perceptual Appearances, (eds) C. Hill & B. McLaughlin.
Lack of imagination: individual differences in mental imagery and the significance of consciousness, in J. Kallestrup & M. Sprevak (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Mind Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
The temporal structure of experience, in D. Lloyd & V. Arstila (eds.) Subjective Time: the Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality MIT Press, 2014.
Breaking the silence: motion silencing and experience of change, Philosophical Studies, 168(3), 2014.
Experience of and in time, Philosophy Compass, 9(2), 2014.
Cetacean semantics: a reply to Sainsbury, Analysis 74(3), 2014.
Hearing and hallucinating silence, in F. Macpherson & D. Platchias (eds) Hallucination MIT Press, 2013.
Perceiving the passing of time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXIII, 2013.
Afterimages and sensation, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research LXXXVII(2), 2013. *Chosen as one of the 'best ten' papers of 2013 by the Philosopher's Annual.*
Attention to the passage of time, Philosophical Perspectives 26(1), 2012.
Attention and iconic memory, in C. Mole, D. Smithies & W. Wu (eds) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays OUP, 2011.
Perception and iconic memory, Mind & Language 26(4), 2011. *Winner of the ASSC William James Prize for Contributions to the Study of Consciousness.*
Indiscriminability and experience of change, The Philosophical Quarterly 61(245), 2011.
Stuck in the closet: a reply to Ahmed, Analysis 71(1), 2011.
Perceiving temporal properties, European Journal of Philosophy 18(2), 2010.
Rate abuse: a reply to Olson, Analysis 69(3), 2009.
Experience and Time, Ph.D. Thesis UCL, 2009.
Morgenbesser cases and closet determinism, Analysis 67(1), 2007.
No new argument against the existence requirement, Analysis 66(1), 2006; with Andrew McCarthy.