Papers
In press
Response duration tracks confidence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. With Hanbei Zhou, Rui Zhe Goh, and Chaz Firestone.
[data] · [demos]
In defense of a distinction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Reply to Mudrik et al., On a confusion about there being two types of consciousness.
Better methods won’t achieve consensus in consciousness science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Commentary on Stockart et al., Studying unconscious processing: Contention and consensus.
2026
Postdiction and the speed of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 49, 2026. Commentary on Fleming and Michel, Sensory horizons and the functions of conscious vision.
Pretending not to know reveals a capacity for model-based self-simulation. Psychological Science, 37(2), 2026. With Matan Mazor and Chaz Firestone.
[demos]
Aphantasia reimagined. Noûs, 60(1), 2026.
2025
Event-based warping: A relative distortion of time within events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 154(11), 2025. With Rui Zhe Goh, Hanbei Zhou, and Chaz Firestone.
[data] · [demos]
Spared spatial imagery solves the puzzle of aphantasia. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 29(11), 2025.
What has episodic memory got to do with space and time?. In S. Aronowitz and L. Nadel, eds., Space, Time, and Memory. Oxford University Press, 2025.
Sensitivity to visual features in inattentional blindness. eLife, 13, 2025. With Makaela Nartker, Chaz Firestone, and Howard Egeth.
[data] · [demos]
2023
Visual adaptation and the purpose of perception. Analysis, 83(3), 2023. With Chaz Firestone. Ned Block replies in “Adaptation, Signal Detection and the Purposes of Perception: Reply to Ian Phillips and Chaz Firestone,” Analysis, 83(3), 2023.
Six ways of failing to see (and why the differences matter). i-Perception, 14(4), 2023. With Makaela Nartker, Chaz Firestone, and Howard Egeth.
The perception of silence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(29), 2023. With Rui Zhe Goh and Chaz Firestone.
[data] · [demos]
Eccentricity advances arrival to visual perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152(6), 2023. With Adi Upadhyayula and Jonathan Flombaum.
Naïve realism, the slightest philosophy, and the slightest science. In B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds., Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell, 2023. With Craig French.
Prospective Learning: Principled Extrapolation to the Future. Conference on Lifelong Learning Agents, Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 2023. With A. De Silva, R. Ramesh, L. Ungar, M. H. Shuler, N. J. Cowan, … and J. T. Vogelstein.
2021
Bias and blindsight: a reply to Michel and Lau (2021). Psychological Review, 128(3), 2021. Reply to Matthias Michel and Hakwan Lau, “Is blindsight possible under signal detection theory? Comment on Phillips (2021).”
Blindsight is qualitatively degraded conscious vision. Psychological Review, 128(3), 2021.
Scepticism about unconscious perception is the default hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 28(3–4), 2021.
2020
Austerity and Illusion. Philosophers’ Imprint, 20(15), 2020. With Craig French.
Making sense of blindsense: a commentary on Garric et al. 2019. Cortex, 127, 2020. Reply to Garric et al., “Dissociation between objective and subjective perceptual experiences in a population of hemianopic patients: A new form of blindsight?”
Object files and unconscious perception: a reply to Quilty-Dunn. Analysis, 80(2), 2020. Reply to Jake Quilty-Dunn, “Unconscious perception and phenomenal coherence.”
The fundamental problem with no-cognition paradigms. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 24(3), 2020. With Jorge Morales. Reply to Ned Block, “What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it.”
2018
The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 373(1755), 2018.
Unconscious perception reconsidered. Analytic Philosophy, 59(4), 2018. An early ancestor of this paper won the Antwerp Centre for Philosophical Psychology’s Annual Essay Prize.
No more than meets the eye: shadows as pure visibilia. In C. Mac Cumhaill and T. Crowther, eds., Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford University Press, 2018.
Consciousness, time, and memory. In R. J. Gennaro, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge, 2018.
Commentary on “Are we underestimating the richness of visual experience?”. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 3(1), 2018. Commentary on A. Haun, G. Tononi, C. Koch, and N. Tsuchiya.
2017
Does unconscious perception really exist?. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 3(1), 2017. Debate with Ned Block, Bob Kentridge, Megan Peters, and Ian Phillips.
The significance of temporal experience. Editor’s introduction to I. Phillips, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge, 2017.
Commentary on “Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access?”. Mind & Language, 32(3), 2017. Commentary on S. Gross and J. Flombaum.
2016
Debate on unconscious perception. In B. Nanay, ed., Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Routledge, 2016. With Ned Block.
Consciousness and criterion: on Block’s case for unconscious perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(2), 2016. Ned Block replies in “The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious Perception.”
No watershed for overflow: recent work on the richness of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 29(2), 2016.
Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions. Philosophical Topics, 44(2), 2016. Special issue on perceptual appearances, edited by C. Hill and B. McLaughlin.
2014
Lack of imagination: individual differences in mental imagery and the significance of consciousness. In J. Kallestrup and M. Sprevak, eds., New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
The temporal structure of experience. In D. Lloyd and V. Arstila, eds., Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality. MIT Press, 2014.
Breaking the silence: motion silencing and experience of change. Philosophical Studies, 168(3), 2014.
Experience of and in time. Philosophy Compass, 9(2), 2014.
Cetacean semantics: a reply to Sainsbury. Analysis, 74(3), 2014.
2013
Hearing and hallucinating silence. In F. Macpherson and D. Platchias, eds., Hallucination. MIT Press, 2013.
Perceiving the passing of time. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113, 2013.
Afterimages and sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87(2), 2013. Chosen as one of the “best ten” papers of 2013 by The Philosopher’s Annual.
2012
Attention to the passage of time. Philosophical Perspectives, 26(1), 2012.
2011
Attention and iconic memory. In C. Mole, D. Smithies, and W. Wu, eds., Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Perception and iconic memory. Mind & Language, 26(4), 2011. Winner of the ASSC William James Prize for Contributions to the Study of Consciousness.
Indiscriminability and experience of change. The Philosophical Quarterly, 61(245), 2011.
Stuck in the closet: a reply to Ahmed. Analysis, 71(1), 2011.
2010
Perceiving temporal properties. European Journal of Philosophy, 18(2), 2010.
2009
Rate abuse: a reply to Olson. Analysis, 69(3), 2009.
Experience and Time. Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 2009.
2007
Morgenbesser cases and closet determinism. Analysis, 67(1), 2007.
2006
No new argument against the existence requirement. Analysis, 66(1), 2006. With Andrew McCarthy.