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​Publications:

• Scepticism about unconscious perception is the default hypothesis, Journal of Consciousness Studies.
• Austerity and Illusion, Philosophers' Imprint; with Craig French.
• Making sense of blindsense: a commentary on Garric et al. 2019, Cortex. Free link to official version here.
• Object files and unconscious perception: a reply to Quilty-Dunn, Analysis, 80(2), 2020. (For Quilty-Dunn's original paper see here.)
• The fundamental problem with no-cognition paradigms, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24(3), 2020; with Jorge Morales. (For Block's reply see here, and for his original paper here.) Free link to official version here.
• The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 373(1755), 2018. Official version here.
• Unconscious perception reconsidered, Analytic Philosophy, 59(4), 2018.  Official version here. (A very early ancestor of this paper won the Antwerp Centre for Philosophical Psychology's Annual Essay Prize.)
• No more than meets the eye: shadows as pure visibilia, in C. Mac Cumhaill and T. Crowther (eds) Perceptual Ephemera OUP, 2018. Official version here.
• Consciousness, time, and memory, in R. J. Gennaro (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, Routledge, 2018. Official version here.
• Commentary on A. Haun, G. Tononi, C. Koch & N. Tsuchiya ‘Are we underestimating the richness of visual experience?’ Neuroscience of Consciousness 3(1), The Brains Blog, April 2018.
• Does unconscious perception really exist? — a debate with Ned Block, Bob Kentridge, Megan Peters and myself, Neuroscience of Consciousness 3(1), 2017.
• Commentary on S. Gross & J. Flombaum ‘Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access? The challenge from probabilistic, hierarchical processes’ Mind & Language 32(3), The Brains Blog, June 2017.
• Debate on unconscious perception, with Ned Block, in B. Nanay (ed.) Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception Routledge, 2016.
• Consciousness and criterion: on Block's case for unconscious perception, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research XCIII(2), 2016. (Ned Block's reply: The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious Perception, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XCIII(2), 2016.)
• No watershed for overflow: recent work on the richness of consciousness, Philosophical Psychology 29(2), 2016.
• Naïve realism and the science of (some) illusions, Philosophical Topics 44(2), 2016, special issue on Perceptual Appearances, (eds) C. Hill and B. McLaughlin.
• Lack of imagination: individual differences in mental imagery and the significance of consciousness, in J. Kallestrup and M. Sprevak (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Mind Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
• The temporal structure of experience, in D. Lloyd and V. Arstila (eds.) Subjective Time: the Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality MIT Press, 2014.
• Breaking the silence: motion silencing and experience of change, Philosophical Studies, 168(3), 2014.
• Experience of and in time, Philosophy Compass, 9(2), 2014.
• Cetacean semantics: a reply to Sainsbury, Analysis 74(3), 2014.
• Hearing and hallucinating silence, in F. Macpherson and D. Platchias (eds) Hallucination MIT Press, 2013.
• Perceiving the passing of time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXIII, 2013.
• Afterimages and sensation, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research LXXXVII(2), 2013. *Chosen as one of the 'best ten' papers of 2013 by the Philosopher's Annual.*
• Attention to the passage of time, Philosophical Perspectives 26(1), 2012.
• Attention and iconic memory, in C. Mole, D. Smithies and W. Wu (eds.) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays OUP, 2011.
• Perception and iconic memory, Mind & Language 26(4), 2011. *Winner of the ASSC William James Prize for Contributions to the Study of Consciousness.*
• Indiscriminability and experience of change, The Philosophical Quarterly 61(245), 2011.
• Stuck in the closet: a reply to Ahmed, Analysis 71(1), 2011.
• Perceiving temporal properties, European Journal of Philosophy 18(2), 2010.
• Rate abuse: a reply to Olson, Analysis 69(3), 2009.
• Experience and Time, Ph.D. Thesis UCL, 2009.
• Morgenbesser cases and closet determinism, Analysis 67(1), 2007.
• No new argument against the existence requirement, Analysis 66(1), 2006; with Andrew McCarthy.​